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the demands of social policy are strong, 5 they do not usu-
ally overturn a body of decisions so well-imbedded in the
current of judicial precedent. The Maryland Legislature
has already acted to remedy the defects arising from the
application of the "accidental means" rationale in occupa-
tional disease cases, 36 and apparently in hernial7 and sun-
stroke" injuries. The still unremedied routine exertion
cases remain for its consideration.
NELSON B. SEIDMAN
Right Of Mortgagee To Sue Assuming Grantee
Of Mortgage Debt
Rosenberg v. Rolling Inn, Inc.'
Plaintiffs operated coin machines in a supper club man-
aged by Villa Donna, Inc. In July of 1949 the Villa Donna
corporation executed a mortgage, payable in one year, on
the real and personal property of the supper club to secure
a debt of $5,200, owed by Villa Donna to the plaintiffs. The
mortgage was never recorded. In November of 1949, Villa
Donna, Inc. sold the supper club under a written contract
to three individual vendees who were the promoters and
later became the first stockholders of the defendant cor-
poration. The contract provided that the vendees would
assume the mortgage obligation owed by Villa Donna, Inc.
to the plaintiffs. One week later, defendant corporation
ratified the assumption. However, since no written evi-
dence of this ratification could be found, defendant repudi-
ated its obligation and, on June 2, 1951, ceased to make
payments. Plaintiff brought this suit at law for the balance
due on the mortgage debt. Defendant pleaded the Statute
of Frauds. On judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower court, held
that the Statute of Frauds did not apply since the defen-
dant made its promise to the original debtor. "Where the
promise to pay a debt or obligation is not to the creditor,
'For example see: Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss.
906, 55 So. 2d 142, 25 A. L. R. 2d 12 (1951); also, Avellone v. St. Johns
Hospital, 165 Oh. St. 467, 135 N. E. 2d 410 (1956); Noel v. Menninger
Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954); Pierce v. Yakima Valley
Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953).
6 Md. Code (1957), Art. 101, Secs. 22-30; see Gunter v. Sharp & Dohme,
159 Md. 438, 151 A. 134 (1930), and Cambridge Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 160
Md. 248, 153 A. 283 (1931).
8 Md. Code (1957), Art. 101, §36(5) (a).T Ibid, §67(6).
1212 Md. 552, 129 A. 2d 924 (1957).
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but to the original debtor, the promise does not fall within
the statute."2
This application of the Statute of Frauds is one uni-
formly accepted. 3 Its application here, however, empha-
sizes that this was a promise made by the grantee to the
grantor of the mortgaged land. This would appear to make
defendant corporation an assuming grantee of the mort-
gage debt, here sued at law by the mortgagee on that debt.
Decisions and statements by the Court of Appeals in-
dicate the adoption in Maryland of the rule of Lawrence
v. Fox,4 which permits a third-party creditor beneficiary
to maintain an action at law on the promise made for his
benefit.5 In Small v. Schaefer,' the defendant and A en-
tered into an agreement whereby defendant promised to
pay A's debt to the plaintiff if A would deliver certain bonds
to the defendant. Upon delivery of the bonds, defendant
refused to perform his promise. In a suit at law, the Court,
affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff, on the ground that where
one person makes a promise to another to do an act bene-
ficial to a third person, the third person may maintain an
action on the promise.
In Boulevard Corp. v. Stores Corp.,7 on facts parallel to
Small v. Schaefer, the Court, in an equity proceeding
against the promisor by the third-party beneficiary, held
for the promisor since the beneficiary could not prove an
alleged fraud. The present importance of the decision lies
in the fact that Small v. Schaefer9 was cited for the propo-
sition that the beneficiary had an adequate remedy at law
against the promisee on his original promise to pay the
debt owed.
The most explicit statement of Maryland's position con-
cerning the creditor beneficiary is found in a dictum in
Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.10
- Ibid, 556.
a 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1950) §357; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.
1936) §478.
'20 N. Y. 268 (1859), where, upon consideration moving from A to B,
B promised to pay A's debt to C. Upon failure of B to pay, C sued. Held:
C may sue B at law on the theory that the contract was made directly for
the benefit of C.
ISmall v. Schaefer, 24 Md. 143 (1866) ; Boulevard Corp. v. Stores Corp.,
168 Md. 532, 178 A. 707 (1935). See also, Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 190 Md. 52, 57 A. 2d 318 (1948), noted 10 Md. L. Rev. 67 (1949);
Levy v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 210 Md. 265, 123 A. 2d 348 (1N56).
0 Ibid.
Supra, n. 5.
8 24 Md. 143 (1866).
9 Ibid.
10 190 Md. 52, 178 A. 707 (1935). The Court held that a stock-listing
agreement between the N. Y. Stock Exchange and the defendant whereby
19581
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"A third person is a creditor beneficiary where no
purpose to make a gift appears and performance of
the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or as-
serted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a
right of the beneficiary against the promisee which has
been barred by the Statute of Limitations, or by a dis-
charge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable be-
cause of the Statute of Frauds. 1 Restatement, Con-
tracts, sec. 133. The great weight of American author-
ity now recognizes that a direct right of action, either
at law or in equity, arises from a contract promising
performance for the benefit of either donee beneficiary
or creditor beneficiary. 2 Williston on Contracts, sec.
356. y"
Despite the generality of this statement in the Mac-
kubin"2 case, it has been thought that the right of the
creditor beneficiary to sue the promisor in his own name
was subject to one exception: a mortgagee suing on the
promise of an assuming grantee of the mortgaged property.
In a majority of jurisdictions, a mortgagee has a cause
of action against a grantee of the mortgaged property who
assumes the mortgage debt on one (or possibly both) of
two theories. As a creditor beneficiary, he may sue the
grantee on the latter's promise to pay the debt13 or he may
be subrogated to the mortgagor's right to the performance
of the grantee's promise under the doctrine of equitable
subrogation. 4
the defendant was to inform the Stock Exchange promptly of any action
by the defendant concerning dividends was not intended primarily to
benefit prospective purchasers, one of which was the plaintiff; thus the
plaintiff was not a donee beneficiary. The plaintiff could not sue as a
creditor beneficiary since no debt or duty was owed her by the Stock
Exchange.
14 Ibid, 57. This dictum was cited with approval in Levy v. Glens Falls
Indem. Co., 210 Md. 265, 123 A. 2d 348 (1956), where materfalmen were
permitted to recover on a contractor's performance bond since it was
executed expressly for their benefit.
"Supra, n. 10.
2The third party beneficiary doctrine is predicated on the theory that
where a grantee assumes the mortgage debt of his grantor, the agreement
may be enforced by the mortgagee in a direct action at law since the
contract of assumption is made for his benefit; KEIGWIN, CASES ON MORT-
GAGES (1936) 447; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th Ed. 1928) §§948, 952; 21
A. L. R. 439; 47 A. L. R. 339. See also Hayes v. Betts, 227 Ala. 630, 151
So. 692 (1933); Mullin v. Claremont Realty Co., 39 Ohio App. 103, 177
N. E. 226 (1930) ; Herbert v. Corby, 124 N. J. L. 249, 11 A. 2d 240 (1940).
For other cases stating this doctrine, see: 2 WLISToN, CONTRACrs (Rev.
ed. 1936) §383.
14 The equitable subrogation doctrine is based on the theory that the
purchaser of lands subject to a mortgage who assumes and agrees to pay
the mortgage debt becomes, as between himself and his vendor, the principal
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In Scherr v. Building & Loan Assn.,1' the Maryland
Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the contention that
the mortgagee could sue as a third party beneficiary stating
that:
"The covenant in the deed to the appellants that
they should be primarily liable upon all the covenants
contained in the mortgage was an agreement exclu-
sively between them and their grantors. It created no
direct contractual relationship between the appellants
and the mortgagee.6 Whatever rights and remedies in
equity may have inured to the mortgagee from the
covenants in the deed for the assumption and payment
of the mortgage debt by the grantee, we must hold that
the covenant is unavailable to the mortgagee in an
action at law.' 17
The above quotation seems necessarily to indicate that in
this fact situation, the contracting parties had no intention
of benefiting the mortgagee and thus he could not be a
third party beneficiary. The Court concluded:
"... the covenant sought to be utilized by a mort-
gagee for the purposes of a special statutory proceeding
was not made for the mortgagee's benefit, but solely
for the advantage of the grantors in the deed in which
the covenant was embodied."'"
In the Scherr case,19 A for valuable consideration, cove-
nanted to assume B's mortgage debt owed to C. A also
promised to be liable for a deficiency decree in case he
defaulted and the mortgaged property was sold for less
than the amount of the mortgage. A defaulted and follow-
ing a foreclosure sale, C brought a suit at law against A
for a deficiency decree. The Court held that under a local
debtor, and the liability of the vendor, as between the parties, Is that of
surety. Under this theory, the mortgagee does not have a direct right
against the purchaser, but rather his rights are subrogated or substituted
in equity to the rights of the mortgagor (vendor) for the purpose of
collecting the debt owed. KEI0WI, op. cit., ibid. 446; JONEs, op. cit., ibid,
954, 955; 21 A. L. R. 439; 47 A. L. R. 839. For cases applying this doc-
trine see Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 (1890) ; Hopkins v. Warner, 109
Cal. 133, 41 Pac. 868 (1895); Thompson v. Cheeseman, 15 Utah 43, 48
Pac. 477 (1897) ; Hubard & Appleby v. Thacker, 132 Va. 33, 110 S. E. 2W,
21 A. L. R. 423 (1922).
1166 Md. 106, 170 A. 197 (1934).
16 Italics supplied.
I'Supra, n. 15, 111.
Ibid, 112.
"166 Md. 106, 170 A. 197 (1934).
1958]
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statute" only those who have a right to sue at law on the
covenants of the mortgage may obtain a deficiency decree.
Since there was no direct contractual relationship between
A and C, C could not maintain a suit at law against A.
Neither, in those cases2 cited by the Scherr case,22 nor
in the cases23 which subsequently have cited Scherr as
authority, does the Court say that "equitable subrogation"
is the principle to be applied. Yet, in those cases and in
the Scherr case,24 the Court uses the nomenclature of equi-
table subrogation, particularly in describing the resulting
relationship as one in which the assuming grantee becomes
the principal debtor and the mortgagor the surety for the
payment of the mortgage debt. 5
In the principal case the facts, the terms of the agree-
ment and the language used by the Court definitely indi-
cate an assumption of a mortgage debt. When the three
promoters, who later were instrumental in forming the
defendant corporation, purchased the supper club, the busi-
ness was encumbered with a mortgage. The contract of
sale provided that the vendees assumed "'the absolute ob-
ligation of the payment of ... the obligation of several
mortgage indebtednesses existing as a lien against said prop-
erty and most specifically ... an unrecorded mortgage to
Harry Rosenberg and Moe Kaminsky.' "2" Yet, a suit at
21 Md. Code P. L. L. (1930), Art. 4, Sec. 731A, Charter & P. L. L. of
Balto. City (1949), Sec. 521, which provides that if, in a foreclosure sale,
the proceeds do not suffice to pay the mortgage and accrued interest:
"... . the court may, upon the motion of the plaintiff, the mortgagee
or his legal or equitable assignee, after due notice, by summons or
otherwise, as the court may direct, enter a decree in personam against
the mortgagor or other party to the suit or proceeding, who is liable
for the payment thereof, for the amount of such deficiency; provided
the mortgagee or his legal or equitable assignee would be entitled to
maintain an action at law upon the covenants contained in the mort-
gage for said residue of said mortgage debt so remaining unpaid
and unsatisfied by the proceeds of such sale or sales; . . ."
2 George v. Andrews, 60 Md. 26 (1883) ; Chilton v. Brooks, 72 Md. 554,
20 A. 125 (1890) ; Warner v. Williams, 93 Md. 517, 49 A. 559 (1901).
Supra, n. 15, 109.
11 County Trust Co. v. Harrington, 168 Md. 101, 106, 176 A. 639 (1935),
quoting Chilton v. Brooks, supra, n. 21, "'where a grantee covenants, or
by apt terms assumes, to pay a mortgage debt charged on the granted
premises, for the payment of which the grantor is bound, the relation of
principal and surety arises' ". See also Mashkes v. Building & Loan Ass'n.,
167 Md. 270, 173 A. 54 (1934) ; Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Strauff, 171 Md. 305,
189 A. 195 (1937).
166 Md. 106, 170 A. 197 (1934).
21 Moreover, in the passage from Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 (1890),
quoted by the court in the Scherr case, supra, n. 24, the United States
Supreme Court describes an equitable subrogation and Its consequences.
For a general discussion of the rights of a mortgagee, see Slingluff,
Mortgagee's Rights in the Event of a Deficiency, 1 Md. L. Rev. 128 (1936).
1Rosenberg v. Rolling Inn, Inc., 212 Md. 552, 554, 129 A. 2d 924 (1957).
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law was permitted. This suggests, at least, a departure
from the Scherr rule. All things considered, however, it
would be unsafe to infer an intention to overrule Scherr
from this decision.
A previous Law Review note27 suggested that the
Scherr28 rule might apply only to deficiency judgments
under the local statute. Considering, however, that the
reason given for denial of the action at law was the ab-
sence of a "direct contractual relationship," there seems no
reason to assume such a limitation was intended.
Considering it a novation 21 would remove the present
case from the areas of both equitable subrogation and
third party beneficiary. The fact that the purchasers and
Kaminsky, one of the plaintiffs, had agreed that the defen-
dant corporation could amortize the mortgage on the same
basis as the mortgagor, might suggest a novation.' ° How-
ever, by deciding the Statute of Frauds question as they
did, the Court appears to have ruled out this possibility.
Most important was the fact that the defendant corpor-
ation did not challenge the power of this plaintiff to bring
this action. The Court was not offered the opportunity to
decide whether the Scherr exception to the rule of Law-
rence v. Fox31 should continue.
However, the fact remains that the principal case has
raised a shadow of doubt as to the actual rights of a mort-
gagee beneficiary. Until the Court of Appeals has made
a more definite statement in this area, the doubt will
remain.
WILLIAM J. PITrLER
Note, Action at Law by a Creditor Beneficiary in Maryland, 10 Md.
L. Rev. 67, 71 (1949).
166 Md. 106, 170 A. 197 (1934).
A novation is defined as:
"... a contract that
(a) discharges immediately a previous contractual duty or a duty
to make compensation, and
(b) creates a new contractual duty, and
(c) includes as a party one who neither owed the previous duty
nor was entitled to its performance."
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932), §424.
m See 8upra, n. 23, the Mashkes and Safe Deposit cases, where a promise
to the assuming grantee by the mortgagee to extend the time of maturity
was held to be a novation. It appears that the Court is not unwilling to
find a novation where the facts of the case permit.
20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
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